The internet has dramatically reduced the cost of varying prices, displays and information provided to consumers, facilitating both active and passive experimentation. We document the prevalence of targeted pricing and auction design variation on eBay, and identify hundreds of thousands of experiments conducted by sellers across a wide array of retail products. We use the data to measure the dispersion in auction prices for identical goods sold by the same seller, to estimate nonparametric auction demand curves, to analyze the e¤ect of "buy it now" options and other auction design parameters, and to assess consumer sensitivity to shipping fees. We also investigate the robustness of the results by isolating di¤erent types of identifying variation, as well as the heterogeneity of the estimates across item categories. We argue that leveraging the experiments of market participants takes advantage of the scale and heterogeneity of online markets and can be a powerful approach for testing and measurement.
Introduction
The internet has dramatically reduced the cost of changing prices, displays and information provided to consumers, and of measuring the response to these types of changes. As a result internet platforms, retailers and advertisers increasingly can customize and vary their o¤ers. One e¤ect of this ‡exibility is to facilitate learning. Google, for instance, conducts thousands of experiments each year to re…ne its search platform (Varian, 2010) , and Microsoft constantly experiments with its advertising platform (Athey, 2011) . Our goal in this paper is to describe and illustrate another bene…t: what amounts to large-scale experimentation by market participants can be used to address traditional economic questions about consumer behavior and market outcomes.
Our analysis focuses on eBay, the largest e-commerce platform and a primary sales channel for tens of thousands of retailers. We de…ne a "seller experiment" on eBay to be a case where a given seller lists a given item multiple times while varying pricing or auction parameters. This practice -analogues of which can be observed in other internet markets, such as for sponsored search or display advertising -is extremely common. Of the hundred million listings appearing on eBay on a given day, it is possible for more than half to …nd a near-duplicate listing of the same item by the same seller, with modi…ed sale parameters. Drawing on a single year of listings, we assemble a dataset consisting of hundreds of thousands of seller experiments conducted across thousands of diverse sub-markets.
We apply this data to analyze consumer behavior and the e¤ects of alternative pricing strategies. Our empirical strategy is straightforward. For each application, we identify in the data a large number of experiments where the seller has varied the relevant pricing parameter. We pool these experiments, many of which are modest in size, and use …xed e¤ect regressions to identify average e¤ects. The scale of the data is su¢ ciently large, and the variation su¢ ciently pervasive, that we can consider how e¤ects vary across product categories and price points, and use di¤erent data construction strategies (e.g. matching only contemporaneous listings, or sequential listings) to examine whether our estimates might su¤er from endogeneity or sample selection biases. We take this approach to four main analyses.
First, we estimate the variability or dispersion in auction prices, holding …xed both the product and the seller. In an environment where physical search costs are extremely low, one might expect auction prices for a given item sold by a given seller not to vary much and, if the seller also o¤ers the item at a posted price, to be capped above by the posted price.
Instead, we …nd that auction prices vary substantially. The average coe¢ cient of variation is 10-15%, when we compare equivalent auctions in the same calendar month. At the same time, we …nd that auction prices generally do not rise above equivalent (i.e. same seller, same item) posted prices, an event that was more common a decade ago (Malmendier and Lee, 2011) . We reconcile these …ndings by showing that on average auction prices are well below equivalent posted transaction prices.
Second, we estimate auction demand using variation in auction start prices. As an auction seller raises her start (or reserve) price, she lowers the probability of sale but raises the expected …nal price conditional on selling. Variation in the start price therefore traces out a familiar demand curve in price-quantity space. Our nonparametric demand curve estimates have a rather unexpected feature: they are highly convex, so their associated marginal revenue curves are not downward sloping. An implication is that very low and very high start prices should be preferred to intermediate ones. Consistent with this, we show that the observed distribution of start prices is bimodal. We also use the same start price variation to examine a behavioral hypothesis of Ku et al. (2006) and Simonsohn and Ariely (2008) that low start prices can create bidding "escalation" that ultimately leads to higher …nal prices. We …nd some patterns in the data that are consistent with this e¤ect, but the evidence is weak.
Third, we analyze the e¤ect of "buy-it-now"options in consumer auctions. A buy-it-now option allows a buyer to preempt the auction by purchasing the item at a posted price set by the seller. In principle, this can allow a seller to discriminate between impatient but possibly high value buyers, and bargain hunters who are willing to wait for the auction. We …nd that the e¤ect of o¤ering a buy-it-now option depends a great deal on how the buy price is set. At the typical level used by sellers, the e¤ect on revenue is negligible. Consistent with the price discrimination theory, however, sellers do generate additional revenue by setting a relatively high buy price. We also evaluate the behavioral hypothesis that buy prices might act as a reference point in subsequent bidding.
Fourth, we revisit a …nding of Tyan (2005) , Hossain and Morgan (2006) and Brown, Hossain and Morgan (2010) that consumers appear to underweight shipping fees relative to regular prices. This application illustrates how our empirical strategy allows us to exploit the scale of internet data. We expand from the …ve speci…c items studied by Tyan, and the 20 CD and Xbox titles, and two speci…c iPod models in the latter papers, to analyze targeted shipping fee variation for over six thousand distinct items. In this large sample, we estimate that moving from a small shipping charge to "free shipping"increases the expected auction price by more than $2. We also con…rm the earlier …nding that once fees are positive, consumers do not fully internalize increases. We estimate that every $1 increase in the shipping fee reduces the auction sale price by only around $0.82.
The empirical strategy we pursue in this paper, while very straightforward, di¤ers from almost all prior studies of eBay and other internet markets. Prior work has relied mainly on two approaches. The …rst is to use observational data, selecting a small number of narrowly de…ned products and attempting to control for quality variation across sellers and listings by using observed covariates (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003) . The second is to use …eld experiments in which a researcher sells a small number of identical items while varying one or a few sale parameters (e.g., Lucking-Reiley, 1999) . Either way, the analysis typically is limited to a handful of items and tens or hundreds of sales. In contrast, we aggregate evidence from thousands of items and tens or hundred of thousands of sales.
The approach we take is one possible response to a tension in analyzing large-scale internet data. The tension is between, on the one hand, leveraging the vast scale of the data, and on the other hand, obtaining plausible identi…cation of economic e¤ects. We elaborate on this trade-o¤ in Section 4. We demonstrate how biases can arise in large sample estimates that pool listings across heterogeneous sellers and items, even within narrow product categories.
At the same time, we show that e¤ects can vary greatly across products, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from small-scale experiments. Another advantage of our approach relative to researcher-conducted …eld experiments is that it can be applied retrospectively to study how consumer behavior or pricing incentives have changed over time.
The main concern with relying on seller-induced variation in pricing and auction design is the potential for endogeneity or sample selection biases. We discuss below why certain features of eBay's platform make it both easy and desirable for sellers to experiment or vary their listings in ways that replicate conscious experimentation. Still, sellers may vary sale parameters for "non-experimental"reasons, and one signi…cant concern is that our results are driven by sellers changing start prices or shipping fees or auction design choices in response to changes in consumer demand, or only after an initial strategy has failed. To evaluate these potential biases, we also report estimates using a variety of more stringent criteria to match listings, so that for instance we rely only on variation in pricing across contemporaneous listings of the same item by the same seller. The estimates are very similar using alternative de…nitions of an experiment.
A few prior studies have taken approaches related to ours. Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2009) study a platform-wide …eld experiment in which reserve prices in Yahoo!'s search advertising market were changed for thousands of individual keywords. Elfenbein, Fisman and McManus (2012) study the e¤ect of charity contributions by eBay sellers, using a matched listings approach that is essentially the same as the one we employ here. They do not remark on either the prevalence of duplicate listings or the opportunity for using them as a broader research tool. Finally, in Einav, Farronato, Levin and Sundaresan (2012) we use the approach developed here, but apply it to data from multiple years, to explain why sellers on eBay have moved over time from selling by auction toward posted prices.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the use of duplicate listings and "experiments" by retail sellers on eBay, our data construction, and summary statistics. Section 3 uses the experiments data to analyze the problems described above: price variability, auction demand, buy-it-now prices, and shipping fees. Section 4 compares the use of seller experiments with using more heterogeneous observational data, and also shows why results from a limited set of products may not be representative. In Section 5 we conclude by discussing why sellers vary their pricing parameters so often and so widely. A lengthy appendix provides many additional analyses that address various potential endogeneity and selection biases. We replicate all the results using a range of samples and speci…c approaches to matching listings, showing that the results are highly consistent across these alternatives. Sellers on eBay have considerable ‡exibility in designing a sales strategy. Sellers select a listing title and picture of their product, a longer item description, a shipping fee, and a sales mechanism. Traditionally, most sellers have used ascending auctions. This means specifying an auction duration, a start price, and perhaps an additional secret reserve price, or a buy-it-now price at which a bidder can purchase the item before an initial bid is made.
Sellers also can use regular posted prices. Nowadays, posted price transactions account for more than half of eBay's sales volume. It is easy for sellers to change these sale parameters from listing to listing.
The diversity of selling strategies creates an opportunity to learn about how consumers respond to di¤erent pricing and sales mechanisms, to gain insights into consumer search, the e¢ ciency and competitiveness of the market, and to test hypotheses about consumer behavior. At the same time the diversity of the sellers and products, a common feature of online platforms, poses a challenge for researchers. We illustrate this point and how it motivates our empirical strategy in Figure 1 .
Figure 1(a) shows the eBay listings displayed following a search for "taylormade driver" (a type of golf club) on September 12, 2010. 2 The market for even this narrowly de…ned product is large (over 2500 listings) and heterogenous. The products are di¤erentiated (di¤erent models and sizes, new and used), as are the sellers (by location, reputation score, whether 1 Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) and Hasker and Sickles (2010) review dozens of papers using data from eBay. 2 Consumers shopping on eBay …nd items either by typing in search terms or browsing through di¤erent categories of products. Products are displayed as listings similar to Figure 1(a), and can be sorted in various ways. The default sort is based on a relevance algorithm. Consumers then click on individual listings to see more detailed item information, place bids, or make purchases. they are "top-rated"), and the sales mechanisms (posted prices, auctions, buy-it-now auctions, all with di¤erent end times), and the shipping arrangements and fees. Because listings vary along many dimensions, it is challenging to attribute consumer responses to speci…c sales strategies, despite observing thousands of contemporaneous listings in a narrow product category. This problem has motivated the use of …eld experiments in which researchers post a small number of listings, say …fty or a hundred, which vary on only one or two pricing dimensions.
Ideally one would like an empirical strategy that preserves the type of variation in the …eld experiment approach, but that can be scaled to study the larger marketplace. The key idea of this paper is to make (and subsequently exploit) a simple observation, which is that sellers frequently "experiment"with a given listing by varying their pricing or choice of sales mechanism. Figure 1(b) provides an example. It shows a subset of thirty-one listings located by the search query above. They are all for the same item, and have been listed by the same retailer (with the user name budgetgolfer). However, they are not completely identical.
Eleven of them o¤er the driver for a …xed price of $124.99, while the other 20 are auctions scheduled to end within the next week. Also, the listings have di¤erent shipping fees, either $7.99 or $9.99. So this group of listings can play the role of a small …eld experiment to identify the dispersion in auction prices, and their relationship to posted transaction prices, or to assess whether auction prices fully adjust to account for shipping fees.
As we describe below, the behavior of posting near-identical listings with varying prices, fees and sales mechanisms -either contemporaneously or over time -is extremely common.
We discuss below several reasons for this, but one factor is simply mechanical. Auctions on eBay are for a single unit, so a retailer who wants to sell multiple units must post multiple listings. Once a retailer is making multiple listings, there is little cost and some informational bene…t to trying di¤erent approaches, even concurrently given that eBay's search algorithm will typically spread the listings across multiple pages of results rather than in head-tohead competition. 3 The next sections describe how we search eBay's data to identify "seller 3 The advice to experiment with di¤erent strategies is common on websites and discussion boards that cater to eBay sellers. For instance, in a post picked somewhat at random from the reviews.ebay.com site, the user cjackc advises that sellers review historical data on the best day to end an auction, "... and then experiment with your own unique listing to see if you can …nd even more success...."because "... your items are unique and what works for others may not work best for you." (http://reviews.ebay.com/Is-Sunday-experiments"and our approach to aggregating them.
Experiments data
We construct our data from the universe of eBay.com listings in 2009. We exclude only auto and real estate listings, which have a somewhat di¤erent institutional structure. We look for matched sets of listings that involve the same seller o¤ering the same item. Because most eBay listings do not include a well-de…ned product code, we use the listing title and subtitle to identify products.
Speci…cally we identify all sets of listings that have an exact match on four variables: seller identi…cation number, item category, item title and subtitle. We then drop single listings that have no match. This leaves around 350 million listings, grouped into 55 million matched sets. We refer to each set of matched listings as a seller experiment. As an example, the listings in Figure 1 (b), together with any additional matched listings that were active before or after the day of the screenshot, comprise one experiment. 4
Our empirical strategy relies on variation within experiments in sale parameters and outcomes. In this paper, we focus primarily on auction listings and outcomes, which leads us to re…ne the data in several ways. In particular, we restrict attention to experiments that include at least two auction listings and at least one successful posted price listing. The former is necessary to have within-experiment auction comparisons. The latter, as we explain below, provides a useful way to normalize prices in order to make experiments comparable and compute average treatment e¤ects. Finally, we include only those experiments where the listings have a non-empty subtitle. This is a convenient way to reduce the size of the data to make it manageable, while focusing on more professional retailers who tend to use subtitles. In the Appendix, we also report all our results for a random 10% subsample of the experiments that meet our initial criteria. This generates our baseline dataset: 244,119 experiments with a total of 7,691,273 list-Really-the-Best-Listing-Day?ugid=10000000008235490) ings. The data include cases in which a seller posts multiple overlapping auctions and in which a seller runs multiple non-overlapping auctions, as well as combinations thereof. Table 1 presents summary statistics, along with corresponding statistics for the entire "seller experiments" data and for a large random sample of eBay auction listings. In the baseline data, just over a third of the listings result in a sale, with an average price around $67.
By construction, the items in our sample are less unique and idiosyncratic than many items sold on eBay, and the sellers relatively professional. This is re ‡ected in Table 1 in the fraction of items that are "catalogued,"the experience of the sellers, and their tendency to use "sophisticated" sale strategies such as a "But-It-Now" (BIN) option. It also shows up in the distribution of items across product categories. Relative to the rest of eBay, our sample includes more cell phones, video games and electronics, and less clothing, jewelry and collectibles. Essentially we are looking at professional and semi-professional retailers, while eBay as a whole also includes a vibrant consumer-to-consumer market. Table 2 provides summary statistics at the experiment level. The average experiment in our baseline data has 32 auction listings. About 70 percent of the experiments have at least one sale. Figure 2 shows the distribution of experiment sizes. Roughly 45 percent of the experiments have four or fewer listings, but there are also many (much) larger experiments.
The typical experiment includes multiple listings that occur over a relatively short time period, just under two months on average.
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that when sellers post multiple listings for the same item, they regularly vary di¤erent sale parameters. The amount of variation in the data is large. Table 3 reports the number of experiments that contain variation in di¤erent sale parameters of interest. The …rst column shows that of the 244,119 experiments in the baseline sample, more than 140,000 have variation in the auction starting price, more than 17,000 have variation in the shipping fee, more than 90,000 have variation in the BIN option, and more than 92,000 have variation in the auction duration. The remaining columns show that we can …nd large numbers of experiments with variation in a given sale parameter even if we condition on other sale parameters being held …xed. We rely on this below to construct samples of experiments in which we seek to pinpoint speci…c pricing e¤ects.
Empirical Strategy
Our data includes a large number of experiments involving distinct items and sellers. We aggregate the information in these experiments using …xed e¤ects regressions. Let i index experiments, t index listings within experiments, and z it denote a listing parameter whose e¤ect we want to know. For a given outcome of interest y it , we estimate regressions of the form:
where i is an experiment …xed e¤ect and " it is an error term assumed to be mean-independent of z it within experiments.
There are at least two reasons to pool experiments as in our speci…cation. First, many experiments are small, so pooling provides much greater statistical power. Second, it seems easier and more digestible to report an average e¤ect rather than thousands of distinct e¤ects for individual items. That being said, we break out estimates by item value, and discuss heterogeneity across item categories in Section 4.
One challenge in aggregating e¤ects is that the experiments involve items of di¤erent value. A $1 increase in the auction reserve price may be important for a $5 item but not so important for a $500 item. To address this, we de…ne a reference value for each item, and evaluate price changes for an item relative to its reference value. Speci…cally, we de…ne each item's reference value v i as the average price across posted price transactions of that item. 5 Then when we consider auction sales, we focus on the normalized price p n it = p it =v i rather than the auction price p it : Similarly, in studying auction reserve prices, we use the normalized reserve price s n it = s it =v i rather than the dollar reserve price s it . A more general alternative would be to estimate treatment e¤ects of the form f (s it ; v i ) rather than f (s it =v i ) but we …nd, rather surprisingly that there seems to be little gain from doing this.
We rely on two further assumptions to identify average treatment e¤ects. The …rst is that the idiosyncratic e¤ects of each experiment denoted by i enter in an additive and separable 5 Recall that in selecting experiments into our baseline sample, we required each experiment to have at least one successful posted price listing. Note that we use posted price transactions and not listings so that the reference value is not a¤ected by excessively high posted prices that never sell. We also experimented with modi…cations to this de…nition, for example using the median transaction price or trimming outliers before taking averages, and the results (not reported) remain virtually the same.
way. The second is that sale parameters within each experiment are not correlated with factors that bear directly on auction outcomes. This assumption deserves some discussion, which we turn to next.
Threats to Identi…cation
In our baseline analysis, we group listings of a given item by a given seller over a period of up to a year, and estimate treatment e¤ects using variation in auction parameters within these matched listings. An obvious concern is that sellers may be changing their sale parameters as a reaction to changing demand. Then our estimates will su¤er from a standard endogeneity bias. Our estimates also could be tainted by various forms of selection bias, for instance if sellers change their sale parameters only after an initial strategy has failed.
One way to address these concerns is to vary the de…nition of an experiment, by using more stringent criteria for matching listings. For instance, we can match listings only if they occur within a short time window, or overlap in time, or even start and end on the same day. As we strengthen the criteria, we reduce any potential variation in demand, as well as any possible variation in the seller's information at the time of posting. Doing this, however, has the drawback that it throws out a great deal of potentially valuable data, such as from sellers who are experimenting with their sale parameters in a persistent and ongoing way.
Relying on short time windows, or contemporaneous listings, also raises a di¤erent concern. It is a concern that also could be raised about many …eld experiments. The concern is that nearly-identical listings may compete with one another. The structure of eBay's search algorithms, which spread duplicate listings over many pages of closely related listings, arguably alleviates this concern. Nevertheless, it suggests that an alternative approach of grouping near-identical listings that do not overlap in time also may be valuable.
A virtue of our general approach is that it is straightforward to replicate our estimates using any of these alternative de…nitions of an experiment. In the Appendix, we report replications of all our results using a variety of di¤erent samples and speci…cations. In particular, we report results where listings are grouped only if they occur in overlapping fashion, only if they occur contemporaneously, only if they occur sequentially, and only if they occur sequentially but within a thirty day period. We also report results for a subsample of large experiments, and for a sample in which all auctions occurred in the presence of a parallel posted price listing.
The results remain strikingly similar across all these exercises. For this reason, the main text proceeds in straight-ahead fashion, without continual references to the Appendix.
Learning from Seller Experiments
In this section, we use the experiments data to analyze selective questions about auction design, consumer behavior, and market outcomes. Because one of our goals is to illustrate the scope of the approach, we consider several di¤erent questions, focusing on ones that have been relatively central to discussions of internet commerce. We relate our results to prior …ndings along the way. In ongoing work (Einav et al., 2012) , we show how seller experiments can be combined with other theoretical and empirical approaches to explore more fully some of the …ndings about consumer preferences and draw out the implications for optimal seller and market responses.
Price Dispersion and "Excessive Bidding"
We start by reporting some large-sample …ndings about the variability in auction prices.
The …rst is that auction prices for identical items sold by the same seller vary substantially, by around 10-15%, even if one focuses on auctions that occur close in time. The second is that auction prices generally do not rise above equivalent posted prices. A third …nding that reconciles the …rst two is that auction prices, on average, are signi…cantly below equivalent posted prices.
These …ndings relate to an ongoing debate about price dispersion and consumer search in online markets. In principle, the low physical search costs on the internet should limit price dispersion. Yet studies by Bailey (1998) , Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001) , Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004) and Ellison and Ellison (2009) , all report substantial dispersion in posted prices, even on structured price comparison websites. 6 Recent work by Malmendier and Lee (2011) also provides a striking "failure" of consumer search. They document an episode on eBay in 2004 in which a particular board game was available from two sellers for $129.95, while other sellers o¤ered the game for auction. Malmendier and Lee …nd that auction prices exceeded the posted price more than 40 percent of the time, often by 10 dollars or more.
They argue that this is inconsistent with rational search and that a signi…cant number of consumers are irrationally over-bidding.
A complicating factor in existing studies is that prices are compared across retailers, and the prices being compared are typically posted prices rather than transaction prices.
This makes it di¢ cult to disentangle di¤erences in retailer attractiveness from frictions in consumer search, or in some cases to rule out the possibility that consumers mostly ignore high-priced alternatives. Our experiments data allow us to identify the transaction price variability across auctions by a single seller, both on average and for di¤erent types of sellers and products. In addition, by focusing on auctions that overlap with the presence of an equivalent (same seller, same item) posted price listing, we can examine the Malmendier and Lee over-bidding hypothesis for a sample of hundreds of thousands of items.
We report our basic …ndings on price dispersion in Table 4 . We use as our metric the coe¢ cient of price variation, or the standard deviation of a group of auction prices divided by the mean price. We compute the coe¢ cient of price variation for each experiment, and for a re…nement in which we partition each experiment by calendar month. The average coe¢ cient of price variation is 0.11 (0.10 with the …ner partition of each experiment). The degree of variation climbs to 0.15 if we also consider matched sets of auction listings (same seller, same item) that do not have a matched …xed price sale. In contrast, there is less variability for experienced sellers, or when the seller uses a BIN option or a higher reserve price. Overall, however, 10% to 15% price variation across equivalent auctions appears to be a pervasive feature of the market.
Next, we report on how auction prices compare to equivalent posted prices. Recall that we de…ned an item's reference price or "value"v i to be the average price across posted price sales of the item by the same seller. For a successful auction with price p it , de…ne p it =v i to be the relative price. Figure 3 (a) plots the distribution of relative auction prices for items with values less than $10, between $10 and $30, between $30 and $100, and between $100 and $1,000. Our data also include a few goods that sell for posted prices above $1,000, but they are su¢ ciently rare that we drop them to focus the analysis.
Auction prices are strikingly low compared to equivalent posted prices. The average relative price is around 0.84, and the median is around 0.87. So around half of the auction sales we observe occurred at a discount of 13 percent or more relative to the posted price.
We also can examine the prevalence of excessive bidding in which the auction price exceeds the reference value. This is relatively atypical. Less than 20 percent of auction prices exceed the reference price, and most of these episodes involve very small overpayments. To see this, Figure 3 (b) plots the analogous distribution of p it v i ; the absolute (dollar) di¤erence between the auction and reference price. Of the 1,178,855 successful auctions in our sample, only about 5 percent result in prices more than $10 above the item's posted price.
To be consistent with the subsequent analysis in the paper, Figure 3 compares auction prices to the average posted sale price of the same item over the course of the year. If one is looking for over-bidding, a more apt comparison might be to a concurrent posted price o¤ered by the same seller, should one exist. In the appendix we repeat the analysis, limiting attention to auctions for which there was a matched posted price o¤er available at the auction close (when most bidding occurs). Our data includes 98,536 successful auctions that meet this criteria. Interestingly, when we replicate Figure 3 for this smaller sample, the results are nearly the same, with the vast majority of auction sales occurring below the posted price and very few meaningfully above (see Appendix Figure G .3).
To summarize, we have used hundreds of thousands of matched auction listings to document signi…cant price variation across sales of identical goods by identical sellers. The same approach indicates that auction prices exceed their matched posted price rather infrequently, and on average are well below. The latter …nding suggests that consumers who pay the posted price, rather than getting a discount by avoiding auction fever, are paying extra for the convenience of an immediate guaranteed purchase. We explore this issue, and the implications for sellers in deciding whether to o¤er items by auction, posted price or both in Einav et al. (2012) .
Auction Start Prices and Demand Curves
In this section, we show how variation in auction start prices (or reserve prices) can be used to test some basic principles of auction theory and to trace out nonparametric auction demand curves. In a standard private value auction model, an increase in the reserve price lowers the probability of a successful sale, but raises the price conditional on sale. The price increase occurs because increasing the reserve price from s to s 0 either eliminates sales that would occur at prices between s and s 0 or forces their price up to s 0 . Conditional on the auction price increasing above s 0 , the distribution of sale prices is the same whether the reserve price was s or s 0 .
There are other models of auctions in which reserve prices can have more nuanced effects. These include models with entry or bidding costs, or with common value elements, or behavioral models. For instance, Ku et al. (2006) argue that bidders may exhibit escalating commitment so that lower start prices increase the odds of a sale and also the price conditional on sale. They present supporting evidence of this based on a sample of Persian rug and digital camera auctions on eBay. Simonsohn and Ariely (2008) found that while lower start prices did not necessarily increase the price conditional on sale, they did increase the price conditional on it rising above the higher start price -again consistent with a "bidding frenzy" theory. In contrast, other researchers (Kamins et al., 2004; Reiley, 2006; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007) found that lower start prices generally led to lower prices conditional on sale, without testing the upper tail.
We take a large-sample approach to these hypotheses using our experiments data. There are 142,653 experiments in our baseline sample with variation in the start price. To limit the variation in other auction parameters, we restrict attention to listings with free shipping, no secret reserve price, and no BIN option. This leaves 19,777 experiments with start price variation, encompassing a total of 494,170 listings, or about 25 listings on average per experiment. As above, we normalize start and sale prices by the items'reference values, so a start price of 0.35 means that a particular auction started at a price that was 35% of the item's posted price.
There is a stunning amount of variation in start prices. The top panel of Table 5 shows the overall distribution of start prices for items of di¤erent values. The bottom panel summarizes the within-experiment price variation. For the latter, we …nd the minimum and maximum start price for each experiment, and cross-tabulate the experiments according to these numbers. It is quite common for a seller to auction the same item multiple times with widely di¤erent start prices. For instance, of the 3,262 experiments that contain at least one very low start price (p n it < 0:05), 1,401 (43 percent) have at least one listing with a start price of p n it > 0:85, and several hundred have at least one start price of p n it > 1. As we discuss below, there are fewer intermediate start prices, but still enough to obtain robust estimates.
We use this variation to estimate …xed-e¤ects regressions where the dependent variable is either an indicator for a successful sale or the price conditional on sale. We allow the start price to have a ‡exibly estimated non-linear e¤ect by using a set of indicator variables for di¤erent start price levels. The regression results are presented in Table 6 , and in Figure 4 . Figure 4 ) plots the e¤ect of the (normalized) start price on the probability of sale. A sale is almost guaranteed when the start price is very low, but the sale probability drops to less than 0:2 for high start prices. The …gure shows separate sales curves for each of our four value categories. These come from separately estimated regressions, so that each plot is an average sales curve for a set of items of roughly similar value. The sales curves are remarkably similar (and close to linear) across price categories.
Thus it appears that the probability of sale depends a great deal on the start price relative to the item's value, but not so much on the value of start price per se. The relationship is estimated only for auctions that result in a sale. The estimates are again remarkably similar across price categories. For start prices below 0.6, the expected auction price conditional on sale is generally around 0.8. One interpretation of the ‡at price curve for lower start prices is that there is enough competition in the market to keep auction prices from slipping very far even if the start price is very low. For higher start prices, of course, start prices must exceed 0.8, and indeed the estimated price curves are upward sloping in this range.
In Figure 4 (c) (bottom left), we combine these estimates to obtain auction demand curves. For each possible start price, we plot the probability of sale against the expected price conditional on sale on the y-axis. As the start price varies, we trace out demand curves. To make the …gure clear, we only show the auction demand curve for a sample that pools all value categories, but category-speci…c demand curves are very similar. A somewhat unexpected …nding is that the auction demand curve is highly convex, and the associated marginal revenue curves is not downward sloping as in standard analyses. Instead, the marginal revenue is roughly U-shaped, as shown in Figure 4 (c) which plots a (smoothed) marginal revenue curve for the pooled sample. 7 With this type of demand, a seller would prefer either a high start price or a very low one, depending on his marginal cost, and not an intermediate start price, consistent with bimodal distribution reported in Table 5 .
How do our estimates relate to the various theories described above? That the estimated demand is downward sloping, while hardly surprising, runs counter to the strong version of the "bidding escalation" theory. It is also interesting to investigate the weaker version of this hypothesis, namely that conditional on reaching a given price, an auction that started at a lower price will continue longer. In contrast, the textbook private value auction model predicts that the upper tail of the price distribution (say, above some price p) should not depend on the start price (for any start price less than p). To investigate this, Figure 4(d) (bottom right) plots, for low, medium and high start prices, the probability of the auction price rising above di¤erent thresholds. The plot is similar for medium and high start prices, consistent with the textbook auction model, but low start prices do raise the (unconditional) probability of getting a high …nal price. One potential explanation is that low start prices attract more bidder attention. However, the evidence does not particularly support the escalation hypothesis, as the …gure also shows that the probability of the price exceeding 1.0 conditional on reaching 0.85, or exceeding 1.1 conditional on reaching 1.0, is essentially the same for low start prices as for medium and high ones.
Auctions with "Buy It Now" Prices
Sellers on eBay can experiment with a variety of auction design parameters apart from the reserve price. A particularly novel feature on eBay is that for a small fee of 5 to 25 cents, a seller can specify a "buy it now"(BIN) price at which a buyer can preempt the auction and immediately purchase the item. The BIN price disappears if the item receives a quali…ed bid, and a standard auction ensues. In a standard private value auction model with symmetric bidders, a seller would not want to o¤er the BIN option, because it can allow a low value bidder to preempt a high value one, and this reduces expected revenue. In practice, however, a BIN price may attract consumers who are too impatient to participate in an auction, or encourage bidders to submit an early bid rather than wait until the last minute. Another hypothesis we have heard is that a buy price can serve as a reference point in later bidding, potentially a¤ecting the auction outcome.
Several studies have looked at the use of buy-it-now prices in practice. Standi…rd et al. (2004) auctioned silver dollars and found that buyers tended not to use the buy-it-now option even when the BIN price was set low. Ackerberg et al. (2006) analyzed Dell laptop auctions and found that sellers using a BIN option had revenue that was $29 higher. Anderson et al. (2008) collected data on sales of Palm handheld devices, and found that the BIN option was used more often by experienced sellers. In their summary statistics, the prices of BIN auctions are slightly higher but they do not report a comparison after controlling for seller or item characteristics.
The seller experiment approach allows us to provide large-scale evidence that extends and sharpens these earlier analyses. We …rst identify the 90,404 experiments in our baseline sample that have variation in the BIN price, or in whether the BIN option is used at all.
To avoid confounding BIN choices with other auction parameters, we restrict attention to listings with free shipping, no secret reserve price, and a start price that is e¤ectively nonbinding (speci…cally listings with a value of at least $10 and a start price of less than $1). This leaves us 3,239 experiments with BIN variation, and a total of 123,757 listings. Table 7 documents the amount of variation in (normalized) BIN prices, both across the whole sample We use the within-experiment variation in BIN prices to identify their e¤ect on sale outcomes. Because we focus on listings with essentially non-binding reserve prices, almost all (98 percent) end in a successful sale. Therefore we focus on whether the item sells via the BIN price or instead via the auction mechanism. The top panel of Table 8 reports results from …xed e¤ect regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if an item sells via the BIN price. Items are quite unlikely to sell at high BIN prices, especially prices more than 10% above the item's reference value. It is more common for a buyer to exercise the BIN option when the BIN price is less than 90% of the reference value, but it still happens only for a minority of listings. The top panel of Figure 5 plots the results.
The bottom panels of Table 8 and Figure 5 show the relationship between the BIN price and auction revenue. The results here are based on …xed e¤ects regressions in which the dependent variable is the transaction price. The median (normalized) BIN price in our sample is between 0.95 and 1.00. Setting a BIN price at this level appears to have a negligible e¤ect on revenue. Setting a lower ("under-priced") BIN price apparently reduces seller revenue, while setting a high ("over-priced") BIN price modestly increases revenue.
These results are roughly consistent with the price discrimination story above, in which even a high BIN price might still be attractive to certain buyers but would not undermine the auction process if the right buyer did not arrive.
A more subtle question is whether o¤ering a BIN option that is not exercised might a¤ect subsequent bidding, for example by anchoring subsequent bids. This is a tricky question to get at, and the anchoring mechanism seems somewhat unlikely in that the BIN price disappears once a quali…ed bid is received. Nevertheless, to investigate it, we consider how di¤erent BIN prices a¤ect the probability of obtaining a sale price below certain thresholds, that is, the lower tail of the cumulative price distribution. The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows that the likelihood of receiving below 60% of the reference value is essentially the same whether the seller sets a high BIN price, a low BIN price, or no BIN price at all. O¤ering a high BIN price, however, does appear to somewhat reduce the probability of a sale in the 70-100% range.
Other Aspects of Auction Design
The seller experiments data provides a rich laboratory to explore the e¤ects of other auction design parameters. While we hesitate to overwhelm the reader, we brie ‡y mention a few that are illustrative and relate to earlier work.
A number of studies have found that longer auctions seem to generate higher revenue (Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2010) , or have analyzed the e¤ect of ending auctions on di¤erent days of the week or at di¤erent times of the day (Simonsohn, 2010). Using a similar empirical strategy to the one employed so far, we identi…ed 92,266 experiments with variation in auction duration, 129,955 experiments with variation in the ending time, and 126,027 experiments with variation in the ending day. Our results suggest that overall the e¤ect of the auction duration is small. On average, we …nd that longer auctions with a BIN option are slightly more likely to succeed while auction duration makes little di¤erence for the sale probability of standard auctions with no BIN option. The e¤ects are not large, however, and are less robust than most of our other …ndings. We also …nd little e¤ect of the day of the week on which the auction ends, and we con…rm existing results that auctions that end late at night (midnight to 5am) perform slightly worse.
Another issue that has attracted some debate is the e¤ect of keeping auction reserve prices secret. On eBay, the seller sets a public reserve price in the form of the auction start price we analyzed earlier, but (for an additional fee) can also set a secret reserve price that is not known to potential bidders. When a seller sets a secret reserve price, bidders know that it exists, but learn its level only if bidding in the auction exceeds it. Various factors might make a secret reserve price more or less pro…table than a public reserve price. For instance, Katkar and Reiley (2006) auctioned 100 Pokemon cards, half with a public reserve price of 30% of the item value and half with a secret reserve of 30% of the item value (and e¤ectively a zero starting price). They found that secret reserve prices resulted in lower revenue.
To investigate this question using our data, we match listings of the same item into groups that have similar levels of public and private reserve prices (speci…cally, we do this in multiple ways: either by matching listings that have exactly the same reserve price, orto increase statistical power -by matching listings with reserve prices within 10% of each other). Because the use of secret reserve prices has been discouraged by eBay and is not very popular (less than one percent of eBay listings use a secret reserve, and only 0.60% in our baseline sample), our power is much lower than in previous exercises. Nevertheless, we do …nd 403 matched groups of listings, so we can estimate the e¤ect of using a secret reserve price versus a public reserve price of the same magnitude. Our results indicate that in this sample, there is not much di¤erence in auction outcomes between the public and secret reserve price sales.
Shipping Fees
Shipping arrangements are an important part of internet commerce, and internet retailers frequently compete to o¤er free or expedited shipping. At the same time, one often hears the idea that shipping fees can act as a hidden price that buyers do not fully internalize in making shopping decisions. Tyan (2005) , Hossain and Morgan (2006) , and Brown et al.
(2010) all have studied data from eBay and found that increases in shipping fees can increase total seller revenue (inclusive of the shipping fee), suggesting that a dollar increase in the shipping fee does not lead bidders to reduce their bids by a full dollar to compensate. Sellers also can have another reason to favor shipping fees: until recently, eBay commissions were not applied to the shipping component but rather to the pre-shipping fee sale price.
We are interested in whether buyers internalize shipping fees. To analyze this, we follow the empirical strategy we have been employing throughout, and select experiments from our baseline data that have variation across listings in the shipping fee. To avoid complications, we consider only listings with ‡at shipping fees that are independent of the buyer location. 8
The resulting data contains 117,202 listings grouped into 6,655 experiments, with an average of 18 listings per experiment. A substantial fraction of these listings o¤er free shipping. Table 9 presents the distribution of shipping rates across the listings, and also the withinexperiment variation in shipping fees. In parallel with our earlier analyses, we see sellers trying a range of shipping fees. Table 10 reports results on sale probability and auction revenue (conditional on sale) for several di¤erent subsamples. The e¤ect of shipping fees on the probability of sale is minimal, so we focus on the price e¤ect. Unlike our earlier analyses, we run the price regression without normalizing by the item value, as this helps in facilitating the quantitative interpretation of the estimated e¤ects. With this speci…cation, a coe¢ cient of zero on shipping rate implies that bidders respond to shipping fee changes one-for-one, so that a higher shipping fee is fully canceled out by a lower sale price, and the e¤ect on total revenue (sale price plus shipping) is zero. As Table 10 indicates, our estimates suggest a positive coe¢ cient of around 0.2 to 0.3, suggesting that only 70 to 80 percent of the shipping fee is internalized in the bidding.
In addition, we …nd a distinct e¤ect at zero. Free shipping is associated with an average revenue increase of around $2.50, with a larger dollar e¤ect for more expensive items. The free shipping e¤ect may be some combination of buyers responding to a "free"o¤er (Shampanier et al., 2007) and eBay's strategy of prioritizing free shipping in the search results. Figure   6 provides a graphical illustration of our regression estimates. As shown in the …gure, our estimates suggest that low shipping fees on eBay, of roughly less than $10, are suboptimal. Sellers could increase pro…ts by either reducing the shipping rate and making it free, or by increasing the shipping rate and bene…ting from the fact that bidders would only partially internalize this increase. The observed distribution of shipping fees is largely consistent with these incentives: only a small fraction of the listings are associated with low (but positive) shipping fees (top panel of Table 9 ).
An even more …nely targeted way to analyze the e¤ect of shipping fees is to focus on cases where an increase in the shipping fee was matched by a reduction in the start price.
A textbook economic analysis would suggest that an auction with free shipping and a start price of $10 should be identical to an auction with a zero start price and a $10 shipping fee.
That is, they should have the same probability of sale and expected revenue conditional on sale. Following this logic, we identi…ed duplicate listings with same "inclusive" start price, that is, the same sum of start price and shipping fee. We then asked whether the division mattered. We found 279 such experiments in our baseline sample (and many more where the inclusive start prices were within a 10 cent or 10% range). Our …nding in this sample was similar: increases in the shipping fee reduce the sale price, but less than one-for-one.
The Advantage of Seller Experiments
Seller experiments provide a simple way to isolate variation in a range of sale attributes, providing the opportunity to use large and diverse data to measure various parameters of interest in a scalable fashion. But does the approach convey any particular advantages relative to other creative strategies for estimating treatment e¤ects? The two most obvious alternatives in a setting such as eBay are cross-item observational comparisons that attempt to control for confounding sale attributes, or alternatively, the use of …eld experiments in which the researcher lists items and varies di¤erent sales parameters. 9 In this section, we illustrate some potential bene…ts of seller experiments relative to these alternatives.
Relative to Observational Data
The key concern with observational data in a setting like eBay is the heterogeneity of the items that are being listed for sale and the sellers doing the listing. This makes it di¢ cult to specify an appropriate set of control variables to yield apples-to-apples comparisons, particularly when many item attributes such as the listing title, item pictures and description are relatively "unstructured."We use a variant of the start price analysis from the previous section to illustrate this point. Our illustration entertains what researchers might have done if they had access to the same data, but were not able to group listings into seller experiments.
Absent such a grouping, a researcher presumably would have tried to de…ne comparable sets of products in some other way. One natural way to group items is to rely on eBay's product categories. eBay classi…es products using a hierarchical category structure. At the highest level, listings are partitioned into almost 35 "meta categories," such as electronics, collectibles, baby items, and so on. At the …nest level, products are partitioned into 37,636 "leaf categories," such as "iPod and MP3 players" and "developmental baby toys." Thus, one way a researcher could analyze the e¤ect of start price is to compare listings within a given leaf or (less ideally) meta category. 9 Another possibility might be changes on the platform or the surrounding environment that act as an instrumental variable by encouraging sellers to shift sale parameters, or speci…c institutional features that give rise to regression discontinuity or other quasi-experimental designs (see, e.g., Choi, Nesheim, and Rasul, 2011) . These approaches have been relatively rare and would appear best-suited for examining one particular sale parameter at a time, rather than being easily scalable.
We examine this strategy by running our start price exercise in three di¤erent ways: grouping listings in our baseline sample according to their meta category, their leaf category, and by seller experiment. In the former two cases, we average item reference values within each category to create a category-speci…c reference value, as if all items within the category were perfectly comparable. We then use this average value to normalize the start price for each listing in the category, and re-estimate the e¤ect of start price on an indicator for a successful sale and the …nal (normalized) price conditional on sale, including …xed e¤ects for the relevant item groupings, but also omitting the …xed e¤ects for comparison. For simplicity, we report results only for the probability of sale, and not the price conditional on sale.
We report the results in Figure 7 , which plots the di¤erently estimated sales curves as a function of start price. The estimates for which we group items by (either meta or leaf) category are dramatically di¤erent from what we obtain by grouping identical listings into experiments. To understand the di¤erence, we can interpret the solid black curve in Figure 7 as an average estimate of how the sale probability changes with the start price for a …xed item (and seller). In comparison, the solid grey curves are constructed so that the composition of the items o¤ered at di¤erent start prices is not the same, although they are all in the same product category. The di¤erences in the estimated sales curves indicate that items o¤ered at very low and very high start prices are generally more appealing (in the sense of having a higher probability of sale) than those o¤ered at medium start prices.
Two other patterns in Figure 7 are worth noting. First, the inclusion of …xed e¤ects in all three analyses makes very little di¤erence. That is, it appears that -at least for this analysis -the e¤ect of grouping listings into eBay product categories or into sets of identical items is captured mostly in the construction of the reference value by which we normalize the start price. Second, it is interesting to note that although the meta category level is an extremely crude way to categorize products while the leaf category level is an extremely precise classi…cation, the results obtained from these two exercises are very similar, and both are dramatically di¤erent from the "…xed item and seller" grouping we rely on using the experiments approach.
Overall, the analysis points to a considerable problem of accounting for heterogeneity in large diverse markets such as eBay. This is presumably one reason researchers working with data from eBay or other online markets typically have restricted attention to a very narrowly de…ned groups of products, such as particular pop-music CDs, collectible coins, Pokemon cards, or board games. A narrowly drawn set of products may (or may not) mitigate the problem just identi…ed, but even if it does as in the case of a researcher-conducted experiment, it raises the concern that the results apply only to a narrow context. It is to this separate concern that we now turn.
Relative to Field Experiments
The same ease of listing and selling items that makes seller experiments so prevalent on eBay and other online platforms also makes these settings appealing for researcher-initiated …eld experiments. Administering and funding experiments is costly, however, so although researcher experiments are common, they are typically quite small in scale and scope, focusing on one of a few items, in limited quantity, and varying just one or a few sale parameters to identify a very limited number of treatment e¤ects.
Relative to such exercises, the key advantage of seller experiments is scale and scope.
While, naturally, seller experiments are not as controlled as …eld experiments, we have shown that it is possible to identify millions of seller experiments conducted just in a single year on eBay, and that these experiments cover a wide range of product categories, price levels, and sale characteristics. The scale makes statistical power a non-issue, thus signi…cantly reducing the possibility of both type one and type two errors. The scope allows researchers to isolate a wide range of e¤ects, and also to assess whether an e¤ect observed in a particular product category is broadly representative, or if there is substantial heterogeneity across product categories or price levels in the e¤ects of di¤erent sales strategies.
To illustrate this last point we again return to our analysis of auction start price, and re-run the exercise separately for each product meta-category. To facilitate a graphical illustration, we estimate a linear e¤ect of the (normalized) start price on both the probability of sale (by regressing an indicator equal to one if the item sold on the start price and experiment …xed e¤ects), and the expected (normalized) price conditional on sale (by regressing the sale price on the start price and experiment …xed e¤ects, using only successful sales). This yields, for each category, the slope of the average sales curve for items in the category and the slope of the price curve conditional on sale, with both probability of sale and price being a function of the start price.
The results are presented in Figure 8 and Table 11 . The x-axis shows the e¤ect of start price on the probability of sale, so a value of -0.5 means that an increase in the start price from 0.5 to 0.8 as a fraction of the item's value reduces the probability of sale by 0.15. The y-axis shows the e¤ect of start price on the expected price conditional on sale; a value of 0.1 means that an increase in the normalized start price from 0.5 to 0.8 increases the expected price conditional on sale by 3% of the item's value. Each point in Figure 8 shows the two e¤ects of the start price for a particular eBay product category.
Certain features are consistent across all categories. A higher start price always reduces the probability of sale, and (with the exception of DVDs where the e¤ect is near-zero) increases the average price of successful sales. Yet, the magnitude of the e¤ects varies quite dramatically across categories. For example, one can imagine a researcher running a careful …eld experiment on eBay by listing DVDs (or, more likely, speci…c types of DVDs), randomly varying their start prices, …nding a large e¤ect on the quantity sold, but very little e¤ect on price. This researcher may have no reason to believe that DVDs are special, and therefore conclude that start prices do not a¤ect sale prices, which may be consistent with some theories and less consistent with others. Yet, as Figure 8 suggests, such conclusions would be misleading, as the DVDs category is quite an outlier, and the price e¤ects are signi…cantly larger in all other product categories.
Of course, once one sees the results presented in this way, the di¤erences across product categories become quite natural. Roughly, one can think of categories with a small dp=ds e¤ect or a large (more negative) dq=ds e¤ect as categories with relatively ‡at (i.e. elastic) residual demand curves for individual items, as opposed to relatively steep (inelastic) residual demand. So Figure 8 tells us that products listed in seemingly commodity categories such as DVDs, Electronics, Video and Coins fall into the former elastic category, whereas products listed in potentially more di¤erentiated categories such as Clothing, Jewelry, Sports Memorabilia and Home fall into the inelastic category. While a full exploration is well beyond the scope of the present paper, Figure 8 suggests the possibility of using our approach to obtain meaningful comparisons of price sensitivity and competition across retail product categories.
Conclusion
In this paper we present a new approach to studying behavior and competition in internet markets, by taking advantage of the ease and prevalence of active and passive experimentation in these markets. The approach combines the advantages of small-scale …eld experiments run by researchers with the scale and scope of internet markets and data. It attempts to avoid the major identi…cation problems in large observational studies, but also the narrowness, small sample sizes and limited scope of many …eld experiments. Of course, relying on experiments of others implies less control over the variation, and may raise concerns regarding some aspects of this variation; however, the size of the data allows us to empirically assess how important these concerns may be.
To illustrate our approach, we considered a series of applications looking at di¤erent aspects of consumer behavior and pricing strategies. We extend prior work by estimating in large-sample data: the degree of price dispersion across equivalent auctions, the relationship between auction prices and equivalent posted prices, the (average) shape of auction demand, the e¤ect of buy-it-now prices, and the extent to which consumers internalize shipping fees.
Our empirical approach is su¢ ciently straightforward that given the right data, it should be easy to replicate and apply to other questions. We also expect that a similar approach could prove fruitful in other internet retail, advertising or labor markets. It can also be applied retrospectively to understand changes in markets over time, an approach we are taking in ongoing work.
One question that we have not addressed in this paper, but which we believe is an interesting one, is whether sellers themselves are successful in learning from their experimentation.
Some of the patterns we have documented -for instance that sellers generally tend to avoid intermediate start prices, or low but positive shipping fees -are consistent with the idea that sellers have over time accumulated knowledge about strategies that do not work well.
In other cases, sellers face non-obvious trade-o¤s -for instance between a lower quantity and a higher price -where the optimal decision depends on seller costs that we do not observe. We also have found that sellers do not converge in their listing behavior for a given item; instead, they persistently experiment by varying their sale parameters. This suggests that a successful theory of active experimentation in online marketplaces would be one in which sellers remained somewhat unsure over time about exactly what strategy is best. Understanding how online retailers become more e¤ective, and the process through which this occurs, is something we hope to explore in further work.
Figure 1(a): A standard search results page on eBay
The …gure presents a "standard"screenshot of listings on eBay, following a search for "taylormade driver"on 9/12/2010. The …gure illustrates a "seller experiment."It shows the …rst 8 out of 31 listings for the same golf driver by the same seller. All the listings were active on 9/12/2010. Of the eight listings in the …gure, four are o¤ered at a …xed price ("Buy It Now") of $124.99. The other four listings are auctions. The listings also have di¤erent shipping fees (either $7.99 or $9.99).
Figure 2: Number of listings in each experiment
The …gure presents the distribution of the experiment "size"(number of listings) in the entire auction experiments data (gray) and in our baseline sample (black).
Figure 3: Auction sale price dispersion
The …gure shows the distribution of transacted auction prices p relative to the "reference value"v of the same item. The reference value for each item is de…ned as the average price across equivalent posted price transactions. The top panel shows the distribution of p=v, while the bottom panel shows the distribution of p v. The …gure omits items with a reference value greater than $1,000. These comprise just 1.9% of the experiments and 0.5% of the listings in our baseline data. Table 6 . Figure 4(a) shows the e¤ect on the probability of sale; Figure 4(b) shows the e¤ect on expected sale price. Figure 4 (c) (bottom left) pools all value categories and presents the implied "auction demand curve" and its corresponding marginal revenue curve; see the main text and Appendix B for additional details. Figure 4(d) (bottom right) plots the probability a listing results in an auction price above certain levels, for di¤erent start prices (see text for further discussion). The top two panels show how the seller's choice of BIN price a¤ects the probability the auction sells at the BIN price, and the listing revenue. The sample focuses on items with a starting price of less than one dollar, so essentially all listings sell. The plots are based on the regression results in Table 9 . The bottom panel plots the probability the sale occurs at prices below certain levels, for di¤erent BIN prices (see text for further details). The …gure presents the relationship between auction starting price and the probability of sale for the di¤erent regressions. The black lines represent start price variation within seller experiments, which is the type of variation used throughout the paper. The dark grey lines represent variation within narrow ("leaf") product categories as de…ned by eBay; there are more than 37,000 such categories. The light grey lines represent variation within broad ("meta") product categories as de…ned by eBay; there are 35 such categories. There are two lines for each grouping. The dashed lines represent speci…cations with no …xed e¤ects, so that groupings are used to generate a reference value (average …xed price transactions for seller experiments, and average sale price in each category for the category grouping). The solid lines repeat the same exercise, but are based on regressions that also include group (experiment or category) …xed e¤ects.
Figure 8: Category heterogeneity
The …gure presents the relationship between auction starting price and the probability of sale (horizontal axis) and transaction price (vertical axis) for di¤erent product categories, parallel to the regression results reported in Table 11 . For each category, we run a simpli…ed linear regression of the probability of sale on the (normalized) starting price p=v, and (separately) a regression of the transaction price (conditional on sale) on the starting price. A unit of observation is a listing. Column (1) presents statistics for the baseline sample. Column (2) presents statistics for all seller experiments (that is, including those for which we do not have a corresponding …xed price transaction). Column (3) presents statistics for the population of the entire eBay listings during the same period. A unit of observation is a seller experiment. Column (1) presents statistics for the baseline sample. Column (2) presents statistics for all seller experiments (that is, including those for which we do not have a corresponding …xed price transaction). The table presents the extent of within experiment variation in the baseline sample Each entry in the table reports the number of experiments that contain within experiment variation in the listing parameter that is de…ned by the row header, out of the sample de…ned by the column header. The …rst column uses the entire baseline data, and the other columns stratify the baseline data based on various criteria. The table presents summary statistics regarding price dispersion in the baseline sample (column (1)) and in the entire set of auction experiments (column (2)). Each grouping of listings cuts the data in di¤erent ways. The table presents the distribution of (normalized) start prices, and the amount of variation within experiments, for the experiments we use to analyze the e¤ect of auction start price. The table presents the distribution of (normalized) BIN prices, and the amount of variation in BIN prices within experiments, for the experiments we use to analyze the e¤ect of BIN price. The table presents regression results of listing outcomes on (normalized) BIN price, using experiment …xed e¤ects. The sample includes all items with reference value greater than $10 and only listings with starting price that is less than $1, so that virtually all items in the sample transact. The dependent variable in the top panel is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the listing transacts via the BIN price (rather than via the regular auction). The dependent in the bottom panel is the transaction price (via BIN or auction). The table presents regression results of listing outcomes on (dollar) shipping fee, using experiment …xed e¤ects. Column (1) reports results for the baseline sample, while the other columns cut the data in di¤erent ways. The dependent variable in the top panel is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the listing transacts. The dependent variable in the bottom panel is the transaction price (conditional on sale). Note that the transaction price includes the shipping fee, so in a frictionless market the coe¢ cient on shipping fee should be zero. The table illustrates the heterogeneity in the e¤ects across categories, using regressions that are similar to those reported in Table 6 . We report the e¤ect of auction starting price on the probability of sale and transaction price (conditional on sale) for di¤erent product categories. For each category, we run a simpli…ed linear regression of the probability of sale on the (normalized) starting price p=v, and (separately) a regression of the transaction price (conditional on sale) on the same starting price variable.
